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ABSTRACT
In 2003, when the current war in Iraq began, I became

interested in learning how and why President Bush declared

the first pre-emptive war in the nation's history with the
support of the American people.

In order to determine how

the country was led to war, the project posed the

following research questions: What rhetorical event(s)

led

President George W. Bush to declare war on Iraq with the
support of the majority of Americans?

How did the Bush

Administration manage the crises that developed in
response to these rhetorical events and situations?
To provide an answer to the research questions, this

project investigated the events that occurred from
September 11, 2001 and ended with the first pre-emptive

attacks that took place on March 19, 2003.

Research

included analysis of letters, media coverage and other
materials used to make the case for war, such as neo

conservatives, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and the
Project for the New American Century.
As this project is a critical analysis of rhetorical

events and situations, the primary research method used
was qualitative analysis.

The project provided a critical

assessment of the events that led to the war and offers an
iii

explanation of how Americans were apparently so easily
misled to support the first pre-emptive war in its

history.

The project also demonstrates how the Bush

Administration rhetoric, propaganda, and the fear of the

American public after September 11, 2001 led to the push

for another war in Iraq.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
How does one define war?. According to Mish (1989),

•war is defined in the following way:

1.

a state or period of usually open and declared

armed fighting between states or nations, 2. the art
or science of warfare, 3. a state of hostility,
conflict, or antagonism, and 4. a struggle between
opposing forces for a particular end.

(p. 820)'

Although Mish provides a textbook definition of war, is

this a reflection of what war has come to mean in the 21st
century?

What does the word war truly mean?

country dropping bombs on another country?

Is it one

Is war a

strong country invading a smaller, weaker neighbor and

dominating them?

Essentially, Mish's definition lacks the

basic answers to the questions about what

leads

to war.

Since the beginning of human history, battles have
been won and lost.
they believed in.

People have fought and died for causes
An early and influential military

battle was the Greek-Persian Wars, fought from 499-488 BC.

The first wave of Crusader- Turkish Wars were fought from
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1100-1146, the German Civil War lasted, from 1100-1106, and

the second Norman-Byzantine War was fought from 1100-1108.

The United States also has a history of war.

In the

formative years of the country, several wars were fought
on American soil.

These wars included the French and

Indian War (1754-1763), the Revolutionary War (1775-1783),
and the Civil War (1861-1865) .

The United States has also
The earliest of these wars

fought wars in other places.

was the Spanish-American War, which was fought in 1898 in

Cuba.

From 1914-1918, World War I raged on in Europe.

The United States entered World War I in 1917 with the
sinking of the Lusitania.

Twenty-one years later, World

War II, which began in 1939 and ended in 1945, had Europe

in the grips of war yet again.

The United States entered

this conflict when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in

1941.

Later wars included the Korean War (1950-1953), the

Vietnam War (1957-1975), and the Persian Gulf War (1991).
The most recent war to be waged is the current conflict in
Iraq.

In the past, the United States entered conflicts to
defend itself when it was attacked, defend its economic

and political interests, or to defend other nations.
instance, the United States entered the first Gulf War

2

For

when Iraq invaded Kuwait.

The Gulf War demonstrates the

United States' desire protect weaker nations.

When the

United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, the

country entered in to a conflict in the hills of
Afghanistan.

The goal of this conflict was remove the

Taliban regime from power, topple the Al Qaeda network,
and capture the mastermind behind the September 11th
terrorist attacks, Osama bin Laden.

However, this changed

when members of the Bush Administration began to push for
pre-emptive war to be launched in Iraq. A pre-emptive war

occurs when a nation attacks another nation without being
attacked first.

On March 19, 2003, President George W. Bush began the

second war in Iraq with bombings of the country when then

leader Saddam Hussein refused to leave the country.

The

bombings on March 19th became the first time that the
United States launched a pre-emptive war on another

country.

Purpose of the Project

Ever inquisitive (a trait that I developed as a child

and honed as a reporter in high school), I became
interested in the war that is being fought in Iraq.
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I was

very skeptical when President Bush initiated war on Iraq

in 2003 and became interested in learning how and why the

President to declare the first pre-emptive war in the
nation's history supported by the American people.

As a

result, the following research questions were posed for
this project: What rhetorical event(s) led President

George W. Bush to declare war on Iraq with the support of

the majority of Americans?

How did the Bush

Administration manage the crises that developed in
response to these rhetorical events and situations?

Scope of the Project
The project investigated the events that led the

United States from September 11, 2001 to the current war
in Iraq.

The specific time frame examined was the period

beginning on September 11, 2001 and ending with the first
pre-emptive attacks in Iraq on March 19, 2003.

Research

on the events that led to the war included analysis of

letters, media coverage and other materials used to make
the case for war, such as the neo-conservatives, Weapons
J

of Mass Destruction (WMDs), and The Project for the New

American Century.

4
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Significance of the Project

The project and the investigation contained therein
have practical applications for the field of

Communications and society as a whole.
primary focus of communication research.
primary element of communication.

Message is a

It is also a

It is important to be

,critical thinkers and consider the meaning behind the

message.

People are influenced of the media.

People are

also influenced by the images that the media portrays on a

daily basis.

For instance, they saw pictures of Iraqi

citizens celebrating when the statue of Saddam Hussein was

torn down and were given the impression that the. country
as a whole was glad to have the presence of the United

States in their country.

However, this is not necessarily

what is currently going on in Iraq.

The insurgency in

Iraq and the United States' inability to end it can

suggest that perhaps many Iraqis do not want the United

States in their country.

According to Whitlock (2004),

the insurgency in Iraq consists of different factions of

Iraqi, not foreign fighters.

The project will show how the Bush Administration
rhetoric, propaganda, and the fear of the American public

after September 11, 2001 led to the push for another war
6

in Iraq.

The rhetoric and propaganda used by the Bush

Administration is extremely significant because it

demonstrates that members of the administration first
convinced President Bush, then the American people that
Iraq should be invaded and Sadam Hussein deposed.

Theoretical Perspectives

Three theoretical perspectives can be used explain
the use of rhetoric and propaganda by the Bush
Administration.

The perspectives discussed include: 1.

The Communication Model, 2. Persuasive Appeals, and 3.
Agenda Setting.

The first perspective used to explain the use of
rhetoric and propaganda is the Communication Model or more

specifically the Transactional Model of Communication.

According to Jaffe (2004), the model contains the

following elements: the sender, encoding the message,
message channel, the receiver’, decoding the message,
encoding feedback, the feedback channel, decoding the
feedback, the specific situation, and noise.

states that messages are intentional.
further defines the message as,
by the speaker to the audience.'
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Jaffe also

Griffin (2003)

"The information conveyed

Messages can be verbal or

nonverbal."

(p. 12)

As stated previously, message is a

primary focus of communications research.

Hitler's messages before and during World War II are
a prime example of how messages can influence the

Communication Model.

During their control of the German

government, Hitler and the Nazi party exerted influence

over every aspect of communication.

For instance, the

sender of all messages to the German people was the Nazis.
As a matter of fact, Hitler appointed Joseph Goebbels to

the position of Propaganda Minister, allowing for absolute
control over who provided the German people with
information.

The message channel is another example of

how Hitler's message influenced the Communication Model.
In Germany and. Nazi occupied territories, Hitler

controlled how and where people obtained their information
from.

For instance, the Nazis controlled newspapers as

well as radio.

A second perspective can explain how rhetoric and
propaganda can effectively influence was persuasive

appeals.

Griffin (2003) claims that:

Emotional appeals, or pathos can be one of the most
challenging aspects of persuasion. On the one hand,
research suggests that speakers persuade only when
they appeal to emotions. Appeals to emotions can be
powerful because they encourage your audience to
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relate to an issue on an internal, personal level.
(p. 432)
Griffin also identifies emotions that are primary and

secondary when speaking about persuasive appeals, and one

emotion that is not identified as either primary or
secondary.

The primary emotions include: 1. Fear, 2.

Anger, 3. Surprise, 4. Sadness, 5. Disgust, and 6.

Happiness.

The secondary emotions include: 1. Pride, 2.

Guilt, and 3. Shame.

The final emotion that is common to

persuasive appeals, but is neither primary nor secondary,

is reverence.
Emotional appeals in propaganda during times of war
influenced people in different ways depending on what
persuasive appeal was used.

For example, during World War

II Hitler used fear to persuade German citizens.

Hitler

had the German people convinced that Jews were evil,
mongrels, and rapists bent on destroying the Aryan race.

The Nazi's were also famous for using propaganda that
encouraged the German people to be proud of their Aryan
heritage.

After September 11, 2001, the Bush

Administration appealed to the American people's fear of

another terrorist attack to justify invading Iraq.

9

A third theory that informs this project is Agenda

Setting Theory.

According to the University of Twente

website (2004), the agenda setting theory has several

assumptions related to it.

The website states that

agenda-setting is when public awareness and concern of

relevant issues is created by the news media.

The

University of Twente claims the two basic assumptions that
underlie most research on agenda-setting are:
(1). The press and the media do not reflect reality;
they filter and shape it; (2) media concentration on
a few issues and subjects lead the public to perceive
those issues as more important than other issues.

According to McCombs and Shaw (1972),

"In choosing and

displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters

play an important part in shaping political reality."
176)

(p.

McCombs and Shaw also state that not only do the

readers of this information learn about a given issue, but
how much importance should be placed on that issue from

the amount of information that is provided in the news

story and the position that it takes.

Essentially the

media then sets the "agenda."
Cook (2000) also comments on the use of agenda
setting.

According to Cook:

When policy requires the assent of others, media
strategies are useful for persuading others to act.
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As face-to-face communication has become more
difficult with the growing reach of government, the
increasing number of participants and the dispersion
of authority, media persuasion is a more attractive
and efficient use of resources, (p. 215)

Cook (2000) claims that by using the media, those who make
decisions about policy can express their opinion, comment

on current events, and try to persuade the masses.

Cook

also asserts that:

The publicity provided by the news media can offer
key assistance to officials here in two ways. First,
public opinion tends to see those issues discussed in
the news as more likely to judge politicians by their
stances on those issues . . . Second, even if public
opinion is not activated, politicians respond
differently to more salient issues . . . [I]ncreasing'
the visibility of a particular issue also enhances
the odds that political actors will do something abut
it in a way that is responsive to public attention,
(pp. 215-216)

Campbell, Martin, and Fabos (2000) state the

following about inquiries on agenda-setting,

"Like uses

and gratifications, agenda-setting research has tried to
strike a balance between the views of the mass media as
all-powerful and barely powerful."

(p. 470)

Siune and

Borre (1975) studied agenda-setting in a Danish election.
The study examined the following aspects of the Danish

election: political broadcasts from both radio and

television.

These broadcasts included debates, programs

made by the political party, and programs where the
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candidates were asked questions by journalists and Danish.
According to Siune and Borre (1975) :

citizens.

This study suggests three kinds of agenda-setting
effects. The first is- the degree to which the media
reflect the public agenda, called representation. In
a representational agenda, the public influences the
media. The second is the maintenance of the same
agenda by the public the entire time, which is called
persistence.
In a persistent public agenda, the
media may have little effect. The third kind of
effect—media influencing the public—is exactly what
classic agenda-setting theory predicts, (cited in
Littlejohn 1999, p. 347)

Siune and Burre (1975) also discovered that the programs

with the most persuasive effect, were those that the
Danish citizens set the media agenda.

Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2004) conducted a study on
the presidential influence over the systematic agenda.

In

their study, Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake examined the effects
of the president's influence over systematic agenda issues
such as civil rights policy, . clean air policy, and

domestic farm policy.
Peake,

".

.

According to Eshabaugh-Soha and

. we argue that the president's success in

affecting media attention to issues may differ depending

on policy type."

(p. 182)

Eshabaugh-Soha and Peake used

Vector Autoregression analysis to analyze data collected
from 1950-1988 to determine how much the president's

statements on the aforementioned policy issues affect
12

media attention to the issues.

The primary independent

variable for the study was presidential attention and the

primary dependent variable was media attention to policy

issues.

The findings of the study showed that

presidential influence over civil rights policy and media
attention had mixed success over the time period examined.
The study also demonstrated that presidential attention to

clean air policy also caused the media to the policy.
Finally, presidential attention to domestic farm policy

also affects institutional attention.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Before investigating the events that led the country

from September 11, 2001 to war being declared on March 19,
2003, one must understand the rhetorical nature of war

itself.

Stated more specifically, one must also

understand the rhetoric of propaganda used during times of

war and conflict.

According to Lasswell

can be defined as,

"the management of opinions and

(1927) propaganda

attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion
rather than by altering other conditions in the
environment or in the organism."

368)

(cited in Finch 2000, p.

Further distinction can be made about the use of

propaganda during periods of war.

(1933),

According to Lutz

"War propaganda did not originate in 1914; the

oldest military treatise in the world,

The

Art

of

Sun Tsu, described the technique 2,400 years ago."
in Read 1972, p. 1)

War, by

(cited

A wealth of information exists on the

subject of propaganda use during times of war.

Those who

use propaganda also walk a line between what is the truth

and what is a lie.

According to Dyer (1942) :

the differences between the effect on the people of
propaganda and a Strategy of Truth may be more
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apparent than real. We have said, that all propaganda
winks at truth. There are certain devices and rules
which make propaganda effective, (p. 80)
Dyer suggests successful propaganda is that which

emphasizes extremes and seldom admits a middle ground.

Propaganda also leads a propagandist to take part of the
truth and dress it up in either black or white.

The

result: statements that are part 'truth and part lie.

One way to understand how propaganda has been used
during times of war and conflict is to divide the
literature review into three sections: World War I, World

War II, and the Cold War.

Each section ends with a

discussion about the propaganda films that emerged from

Hollywood during each period.

Films have become one of

the most influential mediums of our time.

Films have the

ability to cross over many social divides that other
mediums cannot.

In the United States for instance, there

are people who cannot read, speak English, or are poorly
educated.

Film can overcome these divides.

From the time

of its invention through the Cold War, films have been

used as a form of war propaganda by Hollywood.

It is for

this reason that film propaganda during each period of war
will be examined.
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World War I

When the first Great War began in Europe in 1914,

America took the position that it would remain neutral in
the conflict.

However, with the sinking of the Lusitania,

the country officially entered the war.

Before the

sinking of the Lusitania, the British supplied America
with encouragement to support the Allies.

According to

Buitenhuis (1987):
The most complex and important role of Wellington
House was to persuade the people of the United States
that the Allied cause was just and necessary, that
they should support the Allied war effort and,
ultimately, that they should join the war on the
Allied side. (p. 54)

According to Buitenhuis

(1987) the British employed the

efforts of well-known authors James Barrie and A.E.W.

Mason to convince Americans to support the war effort.
According to Bruntz (1972), once the United States entered

the war, President Wilson realized that there was a need
for a propaganda agency.

According to Woodrow Wilson's

State Papers and Addresses (1918), as a result,

"On April

14, 1917, just eight days after war was declared, he
created, by executive order, the Committee on Public

Information."

(cited in Bruntz 1972, p. 31)

The members

of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) included the
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Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and Mr.

George Creel who .was the civilian chairman.

The CPI

employed many writers and used thousands of people in

America to its advantage.

The purpose of the CPI was to

gain American support for entering the war.

Creel said:

There was no part of the Great War machinery we did
not touch, no medium of appeal that we did not
employ. The printed word, the spoken word, the
signboard—all these were used in our campaign to make
our people and all other people understand the cause
that compelled America to take arms in defense of its
liberties and free institutions, (cited in Bruntz
1972, p. 32)

According to Blakey (1970) the CPI distributed numerous
publications,

"By the end of the war 2,499,903 copies were

in circulation and historians had established themselves

and pamphleteering as effective agents of literary
propaganda."

(p. 34)

According to Lasswell

(1971) creating the CPI was

equivalent to Wilson creating a separate cabinet, whose

sole responsibility was propaganda.

Mock and Larson

(1968) stated that:
Without specific powers of enforcement, the CPI thus
enjoyed censorship power which was tantamount to
direct legal force, although this was energetically
denied by the Committee during the war.
The CPI
insisted that it was merely an intermediary between
law-enforcement bodies and the people, (p. 20)
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Mock and Larson (1968) also claim, that CPI's

representatives and agents were not able to make arrests,
they didn't often threaten either, but those organizations

that failed to keep the secrecy and patriotism according

to the Committee's standards could be handed over to the

appropriate agency for action.

The CPI provided their

foreign agents with a steady stream of propaganda, as a

matter of fact, Mock and Larson claim:

By the time of the Armistice, the name of Woodrow
Wilson, and a general idea that he was friend of
peace, liberty, and democracy, were nearly as
familiar in some of the remote places of the earth as
they were in New York, St. Louis, or San Francisco.
(p. 235)

One method of transmitting propaganda to the public
that was used during WWI was the Four Minute Men.

One of

the directors of the Four Minute Men, McCormick Blair

(1918) gave the following account of the organization's
origin:

War was inevitable; how could the people of this
country be made to realize the seriousness of the
situation? . . . And then one night someone spoke of
the tremendous movie audiences and how much could be
accomplished if the audience could only be reached.
In less time than it takes to tell, it was agreed to
enlist the support of movie managers in Chicago and
get together a body of men who would speak during
intermission, these men to speak only four minutes
(largely because that was found to be the exact time
available) and be called the Four Minute Men. (cited
in Cornebise 1984, p. 1)
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According to Cornebise (1984) , Creel noted there was a

need for verbal communication during the Great War because
many citizens of the United States were born in foreign

countries and could not read English.

When the Four

Minute Men first formed the organization in 1917, the

group spoke in Chicago theatres.

Arrangements were made

with the managers of the theaters and the group was

introduced to the audience through the use of slides,
which projected the names of the each member of the group.

The slides also stated that the Four Minute Men would be

speaking for four minutes on a subject that was of
national importance.

Cornebise also mentions that the

speeches of the Four Minute Men were blatantly
propagandistic and designed to counter the efforts of the

Germans.

The Four Men were provided with the necessary

information that they needed.

Cornebise claims that one

of the most successful Four Minute Men bulletins was
35,

Where

Did

You

Get

Your

Facts?

No.

The bulletin encouraged

American citizens to challenge- those who provide them with

false information.
In Britain, propaganda was handled by two fronts

during World War I.

According to Messinger (1992),
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propagandists like Masterman, Parker, Brice, and Buchan

directed their propaganda work towards the civilian

population in Britain.

On the military end, the War

Office directed their propaganda to speak to others in

uniform, more specifically the War Office dealt with the
enemy.

Messinger also states that the British government

was blind to the potential that the use of propaganda■
posed.

According to Messinger, Sir George Cockerill, head

of the Special Intelligence Section, was the first to
begin to analyze the propaganda literature that Germany

was distributing through the mail.

British propaganda

organizations also acted as censors, like the CPI in the

United States.

According to Peterson (1939),

"The first

propaganda organization to be set in motion was that of
censorship.

On August 5, 1914, the British cut the cables

between Germany and the United States."

(p. 12)

The

cutting of the cables allowed the British to restrict the
Germans most effective means of propaganda, the news.

Restricting the flow of information at this point in the
war was crucial because many people were forming opinions
about what was going on in Europe.
Propaganda is often used to provide information that

portrays the disseminator in the most positive light and
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portrays the opponent in a negative light.

are other uses for propaganda.-

(1971),

However, there

According to Lasswell

"A large element in propaganda against the enemy

is the invention of ways and means for the transmission of
suggestions to the enemy."

(p. 177)

According to Bruntz

(1972), American pamphlets were also distributed to
soldiers on the German lines.

These pamphlets claimed

that America was not fighting the German people, but the

German Autocrats and said that there would be peace once
the government was removed.

America's wish during the war

was to protect people from the Kaiser and to protect

democracy.

Bruntz also claims that American propagandists

would distribute thousands of postcards to the German
trenches, which had blanks for the finders to fill out in

case he was taken prisoner that the soldier could mail to

his relatives.

Bruntz (1972) also said:

The significant fact is that the Allies seemed as
busy discovering new ways to send paper "bullets"
over the lines as they were at inventing new
implements of warfare with which to fire bullets of
steel at the enemy. Bullets are important, but so is
a strong morale—a will to victory, (pp. 65-67)

Another method that was used during World War I was
propaganda of despair.

Bruntz (1972) states that this was

the second phase of propaganda that was used by the Allied
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propagandists and that the leaflets' goal was to bring
despair to German soldiers.

Soldiers were given leaflets

that claimed that they were in the fields.of death and

asked them why they were among the dead.

He states that

the propaganda stated that:
It was futile, according to Allied propagandists, for
the Germans to make further efforts to break the power
of the Allies. The only result of these efforts would
be death and the grave ... A great deal of
propaganda of despair had in it a touch of
sentimentalism. It called attention to the suffering
of the wives and children of the soldiers. (Bruntz,
1972, p. 102-103)

Other methods of using despair in propaganda included

painting a picture of the rewards that awaited crippled
soldiers when they returned home, according to Bruntz.

The allies circulated stories about veterans of past wars

dying of hunger.

Some leaflets depicted crippled soldiers

in front of hotels with rich and healthy (robust) patrons

coming out of restaurants and ignoring them.

The Allied forces were not the only ones distributing
information to enemy soldiers.

According to Messinger

(1992) :
The Germans also undertook a propaganda offensive
against enemy troops.
The Gazette des Ardennes was
an example.
This illustrated, French-language
newspaper was distributed over enemy lines by balloon
and aeroplane.
It was read with interest by many
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troops, particularly because the Germans cleverly
included information on French prisoners, (p. 17)

Messinger also claims that Germany distributed information
in Russian in some areas of the eastern front and

information was provided in English for Americans who were

traveling through Germany and Austria.
During World War I, German use of propaganda was very
extensive.

According to Messinger (1992) the German press

was organized for the war effort.

The domestic press was

provided with lists weekly of topics that were not to be
covered and given advice about attitudes that should be
adopted regarding subjects that were sensitive.

The

circulation of these papers included countries like
Switzerland, Holland, and Scandinavia.

German embassies

in neutral countries supported the publication of

newspapers in German and the local language.

Hollywood Film Propaganda During WWI
According to Fyne (1994) Hollywood propaganda began
to be used before the beginning of the Spanish-American

war.

On April 21, 1898 entrepreneurs of the film

industry, J. Stuart Blackton and Albert E. Smith, watched
people celebrating and waving the American flag in the

streets when Congress declared war against Spain and got
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As a result, the pair created

the idea for a film.
Tearing

Down

the

Flag,

Spanish

which depicted the U.S.

Army's capture of the installation in Havana, even though
During World War I, Fyne

the event had not happened yet.

also claims that in Hollywood propagandists took advantage
of the opportunity to create films depicting the Germans
in an unfavorable light.

These films portrayed the German

"Huns" as barbarians that were uncivilized and depraved.
Two titles were
Kaiser.

The

Hun

Within

and

To

Hell

with

the

By the time the war had ended in 1918, audiences

in America were exposed to dozens of silent propaganda

movies that justified the war.

In Russia, film was used

to overcome the language and education barriers and
promote the position of the Bolsheviks and Lenin.

One

early example of this was a film that used the familiar

figure of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, a person that even

illiterate Russians could identify.
propagandists also produced

The

Battleship

justified the Bolshevik Revolution.

propaganda films included
Petersburg,

and

Storm

Mother,

over

In 1925, Russian

The

Potemkin,

which

Other Russian
End

of

St.

Asia.

Not all propaganda films during WWI portrayed war in

a favorable light.

The movie All
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Quiet

on

the

Western

Front

was pacifist.

It displayed German soldiers in a

different light from how they had previously been
portrayed in films.

The movie did not portray the

glorious battle scenes, but isolation and death:
The clean cut-cut, young German soldiers, fresh from
their local gymnasiums, resembled any American fellow
walking down Main Street, hand in hand with his
steady girl. In their native way, these German lads
sought only friendship and romance, two pursuits that
were interrupted when the Kaiser's call to arms
dropped them on the European charnel fields. (Fyne,
1994, p. 6)
World War II

Adolf Hitler was perhaps the most successful at using

propaganda to achieve his objectives.

Hitler's use of

propaganda was so successful that the German people were
convinced that Jews and other groups were inferior to the

Aryan race.

Hitler acknowledged the power of propaganda

in war efforts.

According to Adolf Hitler:

arguably the greatest fan of British WWI propaganda,
stridently believed that the British secured military
victory primarily because of the effective propaganda
campaigns the government launched on their own
citizens throughout the war. (Hitler 1943,cited in
Finch, 2000, p. 373)

Winkler (1978) commented on Germany's skill in the use of
propaganda during World War II.

According to Winkler, no

American propagandist could match the power of the German

25

Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels.

Goebbels exerted

total control over radio, the press, and other forms of
expression in the Nazi state.

He viewed propaganda as a

means to control every aspect of life.

He also adopted

Hitler's view that the ability of the masses to understand

information was very limited and they must be provided
with slogans over and over again.

All propaganda under

Goebbels appealed to German citizen's instincts and
emotions, not their rational processes.

Finch (2000) also stated that during war, propaganda
through radio broadcasts was the most effective at
planting a seed of mistrust in political leaders.

During

World War II the Japanese used announcer Tokyo Rose on
radio broadcasts to undermine the morale of Australian
citizens by naming supposed targets in rural towns.
Hitler used radio and short wave radio to spread
propaganda as well.

According to Childs and Whitton

(1942), "... Hitler's armed forces wrought an equally
striking transformation upon American public opinion.

By

the end of June, only a minority of the American people

thought England and France could win."

(p. 98)

America also used radio to spread propaganda during
this period.

According to Horten (2002), however, there
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were- several factors that limited the effects of this

propaganda:
. whereas the networks eagerly collaborated with
the government propaganda agencies and tried to
remain in good standing with the FCC, they certainly
did not risk disputing their regular, profitable
prime-time schedules. The second factor that limited
the effectiveness of this radio propaganda certainly
had to do with America's legacies—from both World War
I and the New Deal. As some letters and opinion
polls amply certified, Americans did not swallow
government propaganda hook, line, and sinker, (p. 63)

In Nazi Germany, the government used propaganda to
instill fear.

In particular the swastika was used to

incite fear.

However, the swastika is not necessarily

inherently fear-provoking.

According to Heller (2004):

Of course not. everyone who lived under the Nazi
symbol was afraid of its powers.
To the contrary,
millions were emboldened by it.
The ancient mark
symbolized good fortune of the German people to have
leader who rekindled their collective greatness. Yet
in order to do so he instilled in the majority fear
of his minority enemies through regular propaganda
blitzes, (p. 850)
Heller (2004) claims that one weapon of hate that was used
by the Nazi's was Der Stiirmer (The Stormer) .

This weekly

newspaper, which was anti-Semetic, was produced by the

Nuremberg war criminal Julius Streicher. . The paper
covered the "crimes" of the Jews, which Included ritual

murder and savage rape.

On the bottom of the publication

the motto, "The Jew Is Our Misery," was printed.
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The

masthead lettering of the newspaper was black and spikey.
The sole purpose of the newspaper was to slander the

"mongrel" Jewish population.

Heller states,

"Fear

triggers hatred and inflames ignorance, which the skilled
propagandists converts into manifestations of terror."

(p.

854) .

In 1942 the United States used images of the Japanese
demon, which had bucked-teeth and four eyes.

Heller also

suggests uses of grotesque images such as these were just
as powerful as if the allies had dropped bombs.
to Heller,

"Extreme caricatures of the Japanese like these

plumbed the depths of fear."

(p. 854)

Goebbels also used

the fear of defeat in his propaganda efforts.
(1965)

According

Bramsted

states:

Another propaganda line pursued in this period did
not dwell upon victory but rather on the sinister
spectre of defeat.
"Strength through Fear" could
only be gained by producing the nightmarish image of
the deeds the enemy would commit should Germany be
defeated.
Fear of this dreadful possibility was to
make the last German man and woman prefer to die
stoically than to live as a slave under a foreign
yoke. (p. 316)
According to Winkler (1978), the Office of War

Information (OWI) was formed by an executive order in June

of 1942 six months after the United States entered the war
to manage propaganda.

Winkler (1978) states that:
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OWI found itself in an awkward position from the very
beginning. The first difficulties stemmed from the
public fears of propaganda that emerged soon after
World War I, lingered on for decades, and never
really died away. (p. 1)

According to Winkler (1978), one of the main reasons for

the public fear of propaganda was George Creel's tendency

towards using overstatement and arguments that were
"acrimonious."

During World War II, some of the OWI's propaganda

Winkler

publications were aimed at America's blacks.

stated that the propaganda pamphlet

Negroes

and

the

War

explained to Negroes what they had to lose under Hitler.
The pamphlet showed blacks as soldiers and civilians in

war work and other types of employment.

The pamphlet

depicted the accomplishments of Negroes and was meant to
quell the doubts of many blacks about the war.

Music was used during World War II to distribute
propaganda.

One group that was targeted by American WWII

propaganda songs was the Japanese.

According to Moon

(2003) :
These songs illustrate how popular culture served as
government propaganda and helped codify preexisting
cultural assumptions about the Japanese to mobilize
the American people for the war effort. They also
drew upon a long lineage of racist thought, primarily
about African Americans and applied to the Japanese,
using music as a method of dissemination." (p. 333)
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Moon (2004) claims that a survey taken in 1942 showed that

the majority of those surveyed believed that the Japanese
were treacherous.

Anti-Japanese propaganda songs also

used notions that were popular about Japanese religious
practices and their racial inferiority, as well imagery of

children and animals appeared in anti-Japanese songs.
Moon also states that:

To propagate and tap into these sentiments, the
federal government pressured the music industry to
produce patriotic music, including songs that dealt
with the Japanese. Government officials understood
the power of music and were interested in using it to
mobilize the American people to support the war.
(Moon, 2004, p. 335)
One anti-Japanese song capitalized on the notion that the

Japanese were child like and needed to be disciplined.
One such song was by Jenkins and Feagin in 1942 called
Spanking

the

Jap,

What is that
That's uncle
He would not
So uncle put

whose lyrics included:

rap rap rap!
Spanking, the Jap
listen to uncle's plea
him across his knee . .

.

(p. 339)

Another mass medium that was used to distribute
propaganda by the Germans during the Second World War was

the newsreel.

According to Bowles (2004), the production

of newsreels was a top priority for the German army's

Propaganda Abteilung in the German occupied zone of
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France.

The name under which the newsreels appeared in

France was the

Actualities

Mondiales

(AM) .

Bowles (2004)

states that the AM:
Produced by UFA, Germany's largest state-supported
film conglomerate, and distributed through a French
subsidiary called the Alliance Cinematographique
Europeene, the AM pushed French audiences to face the
reality of their country's defeat and to accept the
occupation—not in the name of ideological solidarity
with the Nazis, but as a matter of necessity and self
interest, (p. 47)

Bowles (2004) claims,

"Such scenes were meant to persuade

French spectators that German victory in the war was

inevitable, and acquiescence the only viable option to
ensure French national survival."

(p. 48)

As evidenced by this section and the previous one, use

of propaganda during times of war can be widespread.

However, there are those who opposed the use of

propaganda.

There was one man in particular that opposed

American use of propaganda, Senator J.W. Fulbright.

According to Cone (2005) , Fulbright was concerned that
propaganda would become a standard procedure of the United
States government during peace time do well as during war.

Cone (2005) claims that:
Fulbright made sure that antipropaganda criticism
became a recurring theme in Congress.
Throwing the
full weight and authority of his position behind his
cause, he worked to raise public awareness about
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covert and systematic government propaganda campaigns
and their repercussions through hearings, speeches,
televised interviews, and numerous publications, (p.'
167)

According to Cone (2005), in 1941 Congress put heavy
restrictions on the OWI, due to the belief of some that

its propaganda practices violated the traditions of
democracy.

Although Congress had suppressed the OWI,

Congress was also considering a bill which would
institutionalize propaganda in government.

The bill would

provide Voice of America (VOA), America's international
propaganda radio station with permanent funding.

Senator

Fulbright voted for the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948, which was

different from the VOA, in the hopes that his educational
exchange program would serve the same purpose as the proAmerican broadcasts of the VOA.

Senator J.W. Fulbright was not the only person during
WWII to oppose the use of propaganda.

Well known author

George Orwell opposed government propaganda.

According to

Kerr (2002), the matter of principle made Orwell unhappy
about his work with the British Broadcasting Company

(BBC).

Although the BBC was a corporation and not a

government department, it was understood that radio would
have an very important role to play in propaganda once the
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war began in 1939.

During WWII the company came under the

supervision of the Ministry of Information, which served
as a model for the Ministry of Truth in Orwell's work
1984 .

Hollywood Propaganda During WWII

During WWII, Fyne (1994) points out that President

Roosevelt felt that the use of films was the most
effective means of providing the public with information.

Many of the films after Pearl Harbor were B-titles.

B-

title films were generally produced in a matter of weeks,

were usually about an hour long, and lacked
characterization.

Fyne (2004) noted the Office of War

Information (OWI) was the "official watchdog" of the movie

industry, acting like a censor and monitoring the material
that was produced.

After the bombing of Pearl Harbor on

December 7, 1941, many studios began to make propaganda

films.

One such film was

Wake

Island.

This film was

different than other B movies that were produced during

the time period according to Fyne.

Wake

Island

was

created from the headlines of the time, skillfully
portraying the brave defense of Wake Island by the Marine

Corps:
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Paramount walked a tenuous line between fact and
fiction. Naturally, the subplots were contrived, but
the loss of the island was a staggering blow for
America's morale. Hollywood, however, would
manipulate that surrender into strong film
propaganda, containing every element necessary to
motivate moviegoers to praise their country and laud
the honor of its Marines, while debasing the bestial
Japanese invaders. (Fyne, 1994, p. 33)

According to Koppes and Black (1987) one important
question that the OWI asked during this period of film
propaganda, was "Will this picture help win the war?"

Koppes and Black state that this question might seem
absurd,

"But in that' grim year of 1943 propagandists as

well as film makers

seriousness."

took the question with deep

(p. 84)

Cold War
From the 1950's to the 1980's, the Cold War was

fought between the United States and Communist countries
such as Russia, Korea, and Vietnam.

This particular war,

although fought on the battlefield in some aspects, such
as in Afghanistan in the 1980's, was primarily fought off

the battlefield.

During this period, rumors of nuclear

arms proliferation by the Soviets abounded.

During the

Cold War, both the United States and Russia, engaged in the

use of propaganda.

According to Snyder (1995),
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"Far from

concert and dance halls, in the mountains of Afghanistan,

U.S. government media gurus were training sheepherders to
be skilled TV cameramen so that they could chronicle the

nightmare of Soviet military occupation .

.

."

(p. xi)

Snyder also states that during this period, whatever
worked was fair game and that the government ran the

largest full-service public relations agency in the
Also concerned with getting their propaganda

country.

message out, the Soviets would also plant false and

embarrassing stories about the United States in Russian
media.

Snyder (1995) stated:

Probably the most bothersome Soviet press fabrication
the entire cold war, charging the American government
with developing the AIDS virus that would kill only
blacks—an "ethnic weapon" as it would later be labled
by the Soviets—initially appeared in India's proSoviet daily newspaper, Patriot, in 1983. The
accusation hit a nerve because the CIA did maintain
unauthorized stockpiles of paralytic shellfish
toxins, cobra venom, and other biological poisons at
an army laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland, (p.
104)

In the early years of the Cold War anti-Communist

propaganda was perhaps the most prevalent.

According to

Barson and Heller (2001):
Just the word 'communism' was provocative enough to
inspire a host of irrational laws and decrees.
People truly believed that Reds were under the bed—
not to mention in the water supply, creeping through
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the halls of government, and even spying from space,
(p. 8)
Anti-Communist propaganda in America during the Cold War
was so effective that the American public allowed the

government to persecute its .opponents.

Although there

were many anti-Communist propaganda books and pamphlets

during the time in the United States, there were also
those that were produced by the government.
The Cold War period in America also saw its share of

anti-propaganda dissent.

Senator Fulbright continued to

remain active during the "Red Scare" in America.

According to Cone (2005), "Above all, Fulbright feared
that an extremist demagogue like Hitler might rise to
power in America.

In 1950, he feared that the success of

Sen. McCarthy's sordid anti-Communist frenzies might turn
nightmare into reality."

(p. 169)

Cone also states that

according to Fulbright, sources of the most dangerous
consensus-building propaganda were those whom he called
"super patriots."

fact.

McCarthy's acts convinced him of this

Fulbright was also opposed to President Dwight D.

Eisenhower's "Crusade for Freedom," which duped Americans

into donating hundreds of thousands of "Truth Dollars."

The money that was donated by Americans was used to fund
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Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Liberty, which. CIA funded

anti-Communist broadcasts.

President Eisenhower, a

"propaganda fanatic," was compared to the "Ministry of

Truth" in George Orwell's

1984

by Senator Fulbright, who

denounced the President's program.

The Cold War was not only fought between the United
States and Russia, the British but between the British and

Russia.

According to Deery (2004), there was within the

British Foreign Office a unit that activities were focused
on anti-Communist propaganda.

This unit was called the

Information Research Department (IRD).

Deery claims that

efficacy of the propaganda used by the IRD depended on the
correct use of political language:
Thus the IRD sought to put a 'spin' on the truth.
It
employed the weapon not of 'black' propaganda—
strategically placed lies and false rumors, which
remained the sanctuary of the foreign intelligence
services—but of 'grey' propaganda (whereby
deliberately slanted,' non attributable information
was designed and disseminated). (Deery, 2004, p. 16)

the IRD worked to make sure that their propagandists,

broadcasters, journalists, and politicians used words and
phrases that were the most effective in their articles and
speeches.

For instance, Deery (2004) claims that,

"In

describing 'imperialism', the adjective 'Russian' was

preferred over 'Red' because the latter had 'favourable
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associations'."

The IRD

(p. 17)

preferred, to use such

terms as "Czar" and "Knout," which worked well with lines
that harped on "barbaric," and "backward."
Hollywood Propaganda During the Cold War
During the Cold War period in America, many citizens

feared the advance of Communism.

During the 1950s it was

common for schools to have drills to prepare children for
the possibility of nuclear war.

Many Americans stockpiled

food and other supplies and built bomb shelters in their

Senator Joseph McCarthy is

basements and backyards.

perhaps best remembered for his crusade against Communism
in the United States.

Many people in the entertainment

industry were blacklisted because they were suspected of

being a Communist.

This fear was also capitalized on by

the Hollywood film industry.

Numerous films about

Communism were made during the Cold War period.
these films include
Anarchy

Covered,

U.S. A,

Mao's

Yankee

Kennedy's

Little

Red

Go

Cold

Communist

Home:

War:

Video,

Keeping

and

Some- of

Propaganda,

the

Communists

Commies

on

Campus.

After examining the literature about propaganda
during periods of war and conflict, it becomes evident

that the use of propaganda is not restricted to any one
country.

To the contrary, the use of propaganda has been
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widely used by the United States, Britain, and Germany.
Propaganda is perhaps one of the strongest weapons that a
government can use during times of war and conflict to

convince its citizens that the very war or conflict is not
only necessary, but support of it makes those citizens

Before the United States entered the WWI,

patriots.

Britain distributed propaganda aimed at convincing

American public that supporting the war effort was the
right thing to do.

Once the country entered the war,

President Wilson and the CPI distributed information
claiming that it was American's patriotic duty to support

the war.

During WWII Hitler and the Nazi party used

propaganda to convince Germans that Jewish people were

inferior, thieves, rapists, and that they should be
eradicated.

The United States used the same dehumanizing

tactics in their propaganda against Japan, portraying the
Japanese as either little children to be disciplined or

monsters.

The Cold War Period and its use of anti

communist propaganda led Americans to build bomb shelters
and created a Salem-like witch hunt for Communists-by the

United States Senate, which was led by Senator McCarthy.

Theoretical Perspectives
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As discussed in the Introduction, three theoretical
perspectives are used to explain rhetoric and propaganda.

These perspectives include: 1. The Communication Model, 2.

Persuasive Appeals, and 3. Agenda Setting Theory.
of this chapter will be used to describe how the

The end
•

aforementioned theoretical perspectives apply to the use
of rhetoric and propaganda during World War I, World War

II, and the Cold War.
The Communication Model or the Transactional

Communication perspective can be used to describe all of
the rhetoric and propaganda during World War I, World War
II, and the Cold War.

Each of the examples of the

propaganda that was used by the United States, Great
Britain, Germany or Russia demonstrates that the message
contained in the message was very important.

For

instance, When World War I began in Europe in 1914; the

United States did not enter the conflict until three years

after the conflict began.

However, once President Wilson

declared war, the messages that the CPI distributed were

developed to create American support of the war effort.
Many messages of the'time frame led American's to believe

that it was their patriotic duty to support the war
effort.

At the start of the war, Great Britain also

40

distributed messages to the American public which stressed
that the war was in fact just and necessary.

The

propaganda distributed by Great Britain also encouraged
the United States to join the War on the side of the
Allies.

In Germany and its occupied territories, tight

control was exerted over the messages available to the

public.

The domestic press was given lists of weekly

topics that they were not to discuss.

Propagandists use many of the primary and secondary

emotions that were described in Chapter One to persuade.
One of the most commonly used persuasive appeals in
rhetoric and propaganda during the time periods discussed

in the chapter was that of fear.

The best example of

propaganda appealing to the fear of the public was in Nazi
Germany.

Much of the propaganda that was distributed by

the Nazi's during World War II encouraged German citizens
to fear Jewish people.

Nazi propaganda resorted to the

use of fear to convince the German people that the Jews

were barbarians that sought to rape and steal from the
citizens of the "Motherland."

The United States also made

use of this tactic when referring to the Japanese during
World War II.

Propaganda portrayed the Japanese as

someone that American's should fear.
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Just as the Nazi's

were doing in Germany, the United States spread the image

that Japanese were inhuman creatures that should be

feared.

This is evidenced by propaganda that depicted

Japanese as buck-toothed attackers.
During World War I, the Allies used despair (sadness)

against German soldiers.

The Allies would distribute

leaflets over enemy lines that claimed that they were in

fields of death.

The leaflets challenged the soldiers by

asking them why they were among the dead and encouraged

them to return home.

Another popular appeal to despair

that was used by the Allies, was painting a grim picture
of what awaited German soldiers when they returned home

from the battlefield.

This type of propaganda told the

soldiers that when they returned home, they would be

ignored by the rich and would be left to starve.

Pictures

were distributed that depicted crippled soldiers watching

wealthy and robust Germans leaving restaurants and
ignoring their countrymen that had fought for them.

According to Campbell et. al.

(2000), Agenda Setting

theory tells us what to think about.

The theory also

states that the media concentrates on a few issues and

subjects then lead the public to believe that these issues
are more important than others.
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A good example of agenda

setting by the Media was during WWII in Great Britain.
When WWII began, the BBC understood that it would have a

role to play in the war effort.

The BBC came under the

supervision of Ministry of Information during the war.

The BBC and George Orwell took part in the propaganda
effort and agenda setting by providing information that
encouraged India to remain loyal to Britain despite the

fact that they were being provided with German propaganda.

Although controlled by the Germans, the film reels that
were shown in occupied zone, such as France, were also an

example of agenda setting, be it an example of agenda
setting by government controlled media.

The newsreels

forced French audiences to accept their defeat and

occupation.

The films also encouraged the French to align

their ideology with that of the Nazi's as a matter of not

only necessity, but self interest.

The films were a way

for the Nazi's to shape the reality of the French in the
occupied zones.
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CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

The goal of this project was to identify what events

led this country from September 11, 2001 to the beginning
of the war in Iraq on March 19, 2003.

Data for the

project was obtained in a variety of ways.

The first

method was to examine descriptions of actual events

between September 11th and the war in Iraq.

Additional

methods for obtaining secondary data included examining

interviews, detailed accounts of the events that took
place, magazines, and journal articles.

I also looked at how the "neoconservatives" of the
Bush Administration talked about the need for war.

The

neoconservatives of the Bush Administration are Paul

Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, and Richard

Cheney.

I also looked at materials produced to lend

support for attacking Iraq including how the National

Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and the White Paper were used
in the propaganda effort.

Newspaper articles were

examined for common themes to identify possible propaganda
distributed by the Bush Administration.

The context in

which the statements or references to intelligence were
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examined to determine the role they played in the events
that led to war.

r

Critical rhetorical analysis was used to analyze the
rhetoric and propaganda of the Bush Administration.

According to Howard (n.d.) on the Syracuse University's

website, a critical response is not like when we might

criticize one of our close friends.

Howard claims,

"Rather, it is a matter of one scholar evaluating the work
of another scholar."

The website noted, that this type of

critique is not inherently negative in nature.

So in

essence, this project evaluated the rhetoric of the Bush

Administration.

Critical rhetorical analysis makes use of
qualitative, interpretive research methods to analyze
rhetorical texts.

According to the

Psychological/Sociological Paradigms developed by Burrell
and Morgan (1979), the radical structuralist paradigm,

recognizes a subjective perspective and is the viewpoint

applied in the project. The Paradigm focuses on drastic
change,

liberation,

and potentiality.

The radical

structuralist paradigm also emphasizes that over-throwing
or rising above the limitations of existing social

arrangements is important.

This method allows the
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rhetoric and propaganda leading to the war to be examined
to determine how it was being used to limit the

Administration and the American public.
Foss (2004) provides a definition of rhetorical

criticism.

Foss claims,

"It is a qualitative research

method that is designed for the systematic investigation

and explanation of symbolic acts and artifacts for the

purpose of understanding rhetorical processes."

According to Foss'

(2004) definition, rhetorical criticism

consists of three principal dimensions.

include,

(p. 6)

These dimensions

"(1) systematic analysis as the act of criticism;

(2) acts and artifacts as the objects of analysis in

criticism,

(3) understanding rhetorical process as the

purpose of criticism."

(p. 6)

A critical rhetorical analysis provided the

researcher with the opportunity to examine the texts
examined in the project from a more subjective
perspective.
According to Brummet (1994), the job of a good
rhetorical critic is to show people how they should think

about certain things and find meaning in them.
rhetorical criticism should also be liberating.

Good
Brummet

(1994) asserts that, "It liberates you, the critic,
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because it gives you the chance to probe into and develop

some of these other potential ways of experiencing and
understanding."

(p. 77)

According to Brummet (1994)

it is

also necessary that good rhetorical criticism liberate

readers and listeners alike as they share the new insights

that the critic has gained.

Rhetorical criticism is also

judged on the basis of the insight it provides into the
effects of popular culture on society, and whether or not

it expands the options available for society to experience
that influence.

Brummet (1994) also states that:

The critic is not only concerned about power; he or
she is interventionist as well. The critic has some
purpose or goal in mind in doing rhetorical
criticism—as we noted before, the critic is on a
mission. That means that for the critic, judgment of
the text is inevitable and unavoidable.
Judgment
runs throughout all the insights offered by the
critic.
In suggesting that a text means this or
that, the critic Is also judging it. . . Objectivity
is not possible for the rhetorical critic, (p. 102)

According to Foss (2004), the study of rhetorical
criticism involves the study of symbols.

Foss asserts

that by practicing and studying rhetorical criticism, we

become able to comprehend and articulate what it is that
we like or dislike about something by investigating the

symbols.

The study of rhetorical criticism permits the

ability to become more refined and selective in our
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explanation, investigation, and comprehension of symbols
and our responses to them.

Nothstine, Blair, and Copeland (1994), claim that the
primary purpose of a critic of rhetoric is to speak or
write to a particular audience and have an effect on the

thoughts and acts of that audience.

Nothstine et. al.

(1994) also claim that each critic of rhetoric chooses an

rhetorical event from an infinite amount of rhetorical
events, which implies that the community the critic is a

part of should pay special attention to the rhetorical
event that is being addressed because it was chosen over

other rhetorical events.

Nothstine et. al.

(1994) assert:

Thus the critic implies, by the choice of texts, that
the chosen text is more significant than others for
some reason. This does not mean that critics always
must choose the most recent, obvious, newsworthy,
prominent, historically influential, artful, famous,
or infamous text to study, (p. 5)

Nothstine et. al.

(1994) posit that rhetorical criticism

must be prepared to respond to the concerns and the well
being of the community in which it resides.

This also

means that critics of rhetoric should be prepared to speak
to and within the communities in which they reside.

Nothstine et. al.

(1994) also suggest that critics be
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prepared to deal with those who challenge with or pass
judgment on their work.

Limitations of the Project
The major limitation of this project was the

inability to conduct primary research.

Due to time

limitations and budget restraints, it was not possible to
conduct interviews with persons involved in the topic

under investigation.

Primary research would have provided

the opportunity to learn how the American public responded
t

to the rhetoric and the propaganda of the Bush

Administration.

Although it was not feasible to obtain

primary data, there was an abundance of secondary data on

the subject under investigation.

This became a limitation

because it was necessary to condense the information that
was available.

The research conducted for the project

also relied heavily on the use of interpretive,

qualitative research.

The use of interpretive research

resulted in the project being more subjective than

objective in nature.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS AND FINDINGS
As stated in Chapter One, the purpose of this project
was to answer two questions.

The first question this

project attempted to answer "Was what rhetorical event(s)
allowed President George W. Bush to declare war on Iraq?"
The second question the project attempted to answer was

"How did the Bush Administration manage the crises that
developed as a result of these rhetorical events and

situations?"

sections.

Thus, the chapter will be divided in to two

The first section will examine the rhetorical

events that led this country from September 11, 2001 to
the beginning of the war in Iraq on March 19, 2003 and the
crises that developed as a result of those rhetorical

events.

The second section of the chapter will examine

how the Bush Administration managed the crises that
developed in response to the rhetorical events and

situations that occurred.

Rhetorical Events Leading to the War In Iraq
September 11, 2001 is a day that won't soon be

forgotten by most Americans.

Many of us watched the World
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Trade Center Towers becoming towering infernos in the New

York skyline and then watched in horror as they crumbled
to the ground and sent people fleeing for their lives.

Others will remember the smoking wreckage at the Pentagon

or the plane that crashed in the fields of Pennsylvania,

which never reached the terrorists' intended destination.

Soon after these horrifying events in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C., the American public

learned who was responsible for the terrorist attacks.

The name of the group, Al Qaeda, and its leader, Osama bin
Laden.

Not long after this revelation by the Bush

Administration, American troops began their advance into
the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan.

Their mission was

to hunt down bin Laden, members of his terrorist
organization, and remove the leaders of that country (The
Taliban) from power because of their support of Al Qaeda.
To most Americans, this was clearly justified because it
was clear that the Taliban supported Al Qaeda.

It was

also clear that there was a direct connection to Al Qaeda

and the events of September 11th.
However, the pre-emptive war that was launched

against Iraq was not clearly tied to the events of

September 11th.

The question then becomes, how did this
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country move from bombing the mountains of Afghanistan to

invading Iraq?
To answer this question, it is necessary to provide
some background information on events that took place in
this country pre-September 11th.

The path that led the

United States to the current war in Iraq began soon after

the first conflict in Iraq (Desert Storm) ended.
According to Burrough, Peretz, Rose, and Wise (2004), the

war in Iraq:
took root after President George H.W. Bush's decision
to end the 1991 Gulf War abruptly, to pull back the
troops that were slaughtering Iraqi soldiers by the
thousands, and to end the headlong rush north toward
Baghdad. During the 1990's the notion of toppling
Saddam's regime was championed by a circle of
neoconservative thinkers, led by Richard Perle, a
former assistant secretary of defense for
international security policy under President Reagan,
and Paul Wolfowitz, an undersecretary of defense for
policy for George H.W. Bush, (p.232)

Burrough et. al.

(2004) assert that after George H.W. Bush

left office, the "neoconservatives" tried to convince the

Clinton Administration that it might one day be faced with

the possibility of taking military action to prevent other
regimes from the development or use of WMD.

drafted in 1992 by Wolfowitz and called the
Planning

Guidance.

A letter was
Defense

The letter was given to President

Clinton in 1998 by Perle, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, and 15
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others urging that there was a need, for a regime change in

Iraq and a. more aggressive policy in the Middle East.
According to Buchanan (2004) the letter that

requested a policy change and the ousting of Saddam
Hussein was the,

"aim of American foreign policy."

Buchanan also asserts that,

".

.

. the signers all

pledged, they would offer [their]

difficult but necessary endeavor. "

full support in this

(p. 46)

Buchanan also

asserts that the letter claimed that in the first part of

the 21st century, the security of the world would be
determined by how the President chose to deal with the
threat.

Although the neoconservatives provided Clinton with
the letter requesting the President's support in removing
Saddam Hussein from power, the plan had been created five

years before it was shown to Clinton.
Bamford (2004),

According to

"Ironically, the plan was originally

intended not for Bush but for another world leader,

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu."

(p. 261)

The

plan claimed that the removal of Hussein from power was

the first step in making the Middle East into a region
that was friendly to Israel instead of hostile and
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signaled a departure from the former policy of Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, which was peace oriented.
It is important to clarify exactly what or rather who
neoconservatives

are.

(or sometimes referred to as neocons)

According to Buchanan (2004),

"The first generation

(of neoconservatives) were ex-Trotskyites, socialists,
leftists, and liberals who backed FDR, Truman, JFK, and

LBJ."

(p. 37)

Buchanan also states that these

neoconservatives began to shift their focus when McGovern
captured the democratic party nomination for president in

1972, whose platform was to cut defense and for Americans
to come home from Vietnam.

According to Buchanan, the

supporters drifted over to the Republican Party and became
conservatives, which culminated in the triumph of Reagan.
Huband (2004) states that the neoconservatives were

waiting in the wings when President Bush gave his

infamous, "axis of evil," State of the Union Address in
2003, "Cheerleading,, or perhaps leading, in reality was

the group of right-wing republicans led by Wolfowitz, who
had long been preparing for the return to office of an

administration they could mold in their own image."
in Huband 2004, pp. 130-131)

(cited

The neoconservatives banded

together during the Clinton Administration, sharing their
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views and eventually emerged as the Project for the New

American Century (PNAC) on June 3, 1997.

Disillusioned by

the incoherence of the policies of the Administration,

this led them to the conclusion there were four pressing

imperatives.

According to Huband (2004), the imperatives

were:
®
we need to increase defense spending
significantly if we are to carry out our global
responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces
for the future;
®
we need to strengthen our ties to democratic
allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our
interests and values;
•
we need to promote the cause of political and
economic freedom abroad;
®
we need to accept responsibility for America's
unique role in preserving and extending an
■ international order friendly to our security, our
prosperity and our principles, (p. 131)

According to Pilger (2002), Perle, one of the
founding fathers of the PNAC, believed the following about
the war on terrorism:

All this talk about first we are going to do
Afghanistan, then we will do Iraq . . . this is
entirely the wrong way to go about it. If we just let
our vision of the world go forth, and we embrace it
entirely and we don't try to piece together a clever
diplomacy, but just wage a total war . . . our
children will sing great songs about us years from
now. (p. 13)

After the September 11th attacks, President Bush
showed hesitation when the subject of invading Iraq was
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brought up by other members of the Administration.

The

President needed to be persuaded more to believe that
Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat to the United

States and that he was producing WMDs.
Burrough et. al.

According to

(2004), when the President was confronted

about the situation in Iraq, he would often respond,

"Protect my flexibility."

(p.234)

Although President Bush

was unsure of his stance on Iraq,- the Vice President was

clear about where he stood and his position.

According to

the Register-Guard (2004):

Dick Cheney, wields unprecedented influence over
domestic and foreign policy in the White House—so
much influence that some administration critics have
suggested that the vice president is, take your pick,
A) a co-president or B) a puppet master who controls
his titular boss. (p. A12)
The Register-Guard claims that it was clear in the hours

following September 11th that Cheney was at the hub of
decision making and his actions led to the decision to
invade Iraq without U.N. support or anything that

resembled long-range planning for the postwar phase.
Register-Guard also states,

The

"... Cheney, not Rice was

framing choices and functioning as de facto national
security adviser—just as Cheney supplanted the authority
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of others, including Central Intelligence Agency Director

George Tenet."

(p. A12)

It became apparent that the rhetoric of the members
of his Administration was beginning to change the

President's mind about invading Iraq in the months
following the attacks.

According to Burrough et. al.

(2004), British Prime Minister Tony Blair reminded
President Bush to remember what his priorities were.
Blair believed that the President needed to deal with Al

Qaeda, Afghanistan, and the Taliban.
pushed the Iraq issue by stating,

President then

"I agree with you, Tony.

We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with
Afghanistan, we must come back to Iraq."

(p. 238)

The first indication of the impending war with Iraq

and the public rhetoric of the Bush Administration came in
2001 according to Mann (2004) .

Mann states that in

November of that year, the focus of the administration
began to shift from the war in Afghanistan, which was in
its last stages to terrorists acquiring WMDs.

states,

Mann

"On the surface the administration was offering

merely one more rationale for the war on terrorism .

the administration's new stress on weapons of mass
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.

.

destruction was the earliest sign of a far broader

campaign."

(p. 317)

The rhetoric for going to war with Iraq began almost

immediately after September 11th.

Bamford (2004) states

that it was apparent from notes written by Rumsfeld, that
the attacks on the United States would be used as pretext

in pushing a war against Hussein.

".

.

According to Bamford,

. Rumsfeld wanted to 'hit S.H. at the same time.' The

idea was to 'sweep' him up, whether 'related' to 9/11 or

'not.' Wolfowitz had the same idea and quickly began

talking up an Iraqi connection in conference calls with
other officials, including Cheney."

(p. 285)

Bamford

(2004) also states that almost immediately after the

terrorist attacks a secret intelligence unit was formed by
David Wurmser, which went against normal channels and

reported directly to Douglas Feith, the Undersecretary of

Defense for Policy.

The intelligence unit was given the

name Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group.

Bamford

further asserts that those who were brought together to
form the intelligence unit lacked experience:

He (Gregory Thielmann) said the makeup of the
intelligence unit was a giveaway, indicating that
they had no interest in true analysis . . . There's
no logical explanation for the office's creation
except that they [the Bush Administration] wanted
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find evidence to support their answers
about war. (Bamford, 2004, p. 290)

people

to

Lt. Col Karen Kwiatowski, agreed with Thielmann, saying

the unit was providing propaganda and not intelligence.

Bamford claims the purpose of Wurmser's group was to
contribute to the rhetoric of the Bush Administration.

Bamford describes the unit as essentially a pro-war
propaganda cell, which produced evidence supporting the
pretexts for attacking Iraq.

Another supplier of intelligence and propaganda

according to Bamford (2004) was Ahmad Chalabi and the

Iraqi National Congress (INC).
[INC's]

Bamford states that,

"'The

intelligence isn't reliable at all,' said Vincent

Cannistraro, the CIA's former chief of counterterrorism.
'Much of it is propaganda. Much of it is telling the

Defense Department what they want to hear.'"

(2004), Chalabi's family had

According to Burrough et. al.
fled Iraq in 1958.

(p. 294)

The INC, an exile group which was

based in London, supplied- the United States with

intelligence that had either been proven suspect or
fabricated by the CIA.

According to Corn (2003), "The Bush strategy was
clear: hype the threat presented by Iraq, exaggerate and
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embellish. Overstate Hussein's potential as a menace to

America; overstate his ties to al Qaeda."

(p. 219)

Wolfowitz was one person within the Bush Administration

who used the strategy.

According to Burrough et. al.

(2004), Wolfowitz also claimed that there was a 10 to 50

percent chance that Saddam Hussein was involved in the
September 11th terrorist attacks.

(2004),

.

According to Woodward

. Wolfowitz had edgy, hawkish views. The

reasons for getting rid of Saddam were: It was necessary
and it would be relatively easy."

(p. 21)

Woodward

further asserts that Wolfowitz believed that it would be
possible for the United States to send the military to
overrun and confiscate Iraq's southern oil wells.

In the

days after the attacks, Wolfowitz and-the other
neoconservatives would not stop their quest for war in
Iraq.

The ideas that the neoconservatives presented as

"draft plans."

Woodward also claimed:

"The only strong advocate for' attacking Iraq at that
point was Wolfowitz, who thought war in Afghanistan
was dicey and uncertain ... In contrast, Iraq was a
brittle oppressive regime that might break easily
with an opposition yearning to topple Saddam." (p.
26)

The Bush Administration also based much of its
rhetoric supporting the war in Iraq on the premise that
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Iraq had an alleged agreement to purchase uranium from
Niger.

According to Bamford (2004), much of the

information was based on letters that had been obviously

blended together from several older documents that were
genuine.

The phony documents from Niger were created from

letters that had been stolen from the Nigerien embassy in
Rome on January 2, 2001.

The intention of the documents

was to create the impression that Iraqi ambassador Wissam
al-Zahawiah's trip to Niger in 1999, was to arrange for a
shipment of uranium to Iraq in 2000.

The documents also

implied that the ambassador might have something to do
with the attacks on September 11th.
One of the final instances of rhetoric of the Bush

Administration before the war began in Iraq was a result
of the discovery of aluminum tubes.

One of the key

allegations the Bush Administration used to promote the

war was Iraq's capability to produce WMDs.
Burrough et. al.

According to

(2004), in the fall of 2001 a delivery of

aluminum tubes from China was intercepted on its way to
Iraq en route to Jordan.

It was thought by officials in

the administration that the tubes were going to be used

like centrifuges to spin uranium at high speeds so that it
could be used in the production of Nuclear weapons.
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Although Thielmann was not convinced, then Director

General of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet
was sure that the tubes were meant for that purpose.
The rhetoric of the Bush Administration culminated in

2002 when President Bush delivered his State of the Union

Address to the country.

According to Burrough et. al.

(2004), the man who wrote the address, David Frum, was

directed by Michael Gerson to make the best case for war
with Iraq.

During the speech, the phrase "axis of evil"

was coined to describe Iran, North Korea, and Iraq.

According to President Bush (2002) :

States like these and their terrorist allies,
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the
peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing
danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists,
giving them the means to match their hatred.
They
could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the
United States.
In any of these cases, the price of
indifference would be catastrophic, (cited in
Burrough et. al., 2004, p. 240)
Burrough et. al. further claim that the President would go
on to say that the administration would be prepared to

strike pre-emptive wars so that it would not allow the
world's most dangerous regimes to threaten America with

the world's most dangerous weapons.
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Crises That Developed as A Result of The
Rhetoric of The Bush Administration

One crisis that developed as a result of the rhetoric
of the Bush Administration was the pressure that was
placed on CIA intelligence officers charged with finding

evidence that Iraq had been involved with September 11th
and that the country had WMDs.

al.

According to Burrough et.

(2004) :
many Administration officials reacted strongly,
negatively, and aggressively when presented with
information that contradicted what they already
believed about Iraq . . . Intelligence officers who
presented analyses that were at odds with pre
existing views of senior Administration officials
were subject to barrages of questions and requests
for additional information, (p. 242)

Burrough et. al. (2004) claim that CIA analysts were often

urged by their superiors to provide evidence that Iraq

possessed WMDs.

When the analysts submitted papers that

lacked proof of their existence, they often felt pressure

from their supervisors who were constantly questioning

about why they chose a certain piece of information over
another.

Basically the CIA analysts were being

interrogated and asked to defend their findings.
The major crisis that developed was a result of the

rhetoric of the Bush Administration using the National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) as the basis for the White
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Paper.

As mentioned previously, the Administration

believed that Iraq was attempting to purchase uraniuhi from
Niger to make WMDs.

According to Burrough et. al.

(2004),

in the fall of 2001 a delivery of aluminum tubes from

China that were to be delivered to Iraq were intercepted
en route to Jordan.

It was believed that the tubes were

to be used as centrifuges to spin uranium at high speeds
so that it might be used in the production of nuclear

weapons.

Greg Thielmann of the State Department's Bureau

of Intelligence and a scientist from the Department of
Energy were not convinced.

However George Tenet, then

Director of the CIA, was sure that the tubes were meant to

be used as centrifuges.

Burrough et. al.

(2004) claimed

that based partially on the tube evidence, the CIA created

the NIE.

The NIE, a 90-page document, is the highest form

of reporting that can be done by the United States

intelligence community.

According to the document, the

tubes were strong evidence that Saddam Hussein was

reinstating the uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's
nuclear weapons program.

Burrough et. al.

(2004) further asserts that the NIE

was deemed to be insufficient by Congress to deliberate on
the subject of the country remaining at war or peace.
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In

order to come to a decision about whether or not Hussein
was an imminent threat, Congress and the American people

needed to be provided with a document they could read.
The CIA was asked to provide a White Paper or a condensed

version of the NIE document.

It was the request of the

Congress to create the document that led to the

development of a crisis for the Bush Administration.

Burrough et. al.

(2004) also claims that when the CIA was

asked to provide the White Paper, not only was the

original document condensed, but facts from the original
document were distorted to create an even greater threat
to the United States.

Evaluations that were cautious in

the NIE turned in to statement of fact and conclusions
were not just abbreviated, but completely revised in the

white paper.

The White Paper created a scary picture for

the United States and can be considered one of the

strongest pieces of evidence used to support the war in
Iraq.

Response of the Bush Administration

After all that has happened on the journey that led
this country from September

nth

to the current war in

Iraq, some might wonder how the Bush Administration
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responded, to these events once it was proven that there

was no definitive evidence proving the existence of WMD.
The overwhelming response of the Bush Administration after

the war in Iraq began was denial about the fact that they
had been wrong about the existence of WMDs.

According to

Hersh (2004) :

There was, in contrast, little self-doubt or secondguessing in the Pentagon over the failure to
immediately find the weapons. The Pentagon adviser
to Special Plans told me in May 2003 that the delay
"means nothing."(p. 241)
Hersh (2004) also states that they were waiting to hear

information from scientists that could provide the

Pentagon with information about where the weapons were.

Another Pentagon official who works for William Luti,
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Near Eastern and

South Asian Affairs, said that the weapons were hidden in
the mountains of Iraq or transferred to a friendly
country.

President Bush himself also resorted to denial

when faced with accusations that information about Iraq
having WMDs was wrong and supported a report by David Kay,
which fell short of claims that there were WMDs.

According to Hersh (2004), the President felt vindicated
by the report and believed that it showed that Hussein was

a threat to the United States and a serious danger.
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Vice

President Cheney also remained unfazed when the documents
from Niger were proven to be fakes.

In an interview in

September 2003, Cheney claimed that a British dossier's

claimed that Iraq was attempting to obtain uranium from
Africa and that the Administration's previous beliefs had
been validated.

This chapter sought to answer two questions.

The

first question that the chapter attempted to answer was
what rhetorical event(s) allowed President George W. Bush

to declare war on Iraq?

The second question that the

chapter attempted to answer was how did the Bush

Administration manage the crises that developed in

response to these rhetorical events and situations?

After examining the rhetorical events that took place
in the Bush Administration after the terrorist attacks on

the United States,

it becomes obvious how this country

moved from September 11, 2001 to. the first pre-emptive war

in the country's history being launched against Iraq.

In

the days following the terrorist attacks, neoconservative

members of the Bush Administration including Donald

Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, began planting the idea that
Iraq was somehow supporting terrorists and had plans to

develop WMDs.

The Bush Administration also obtained much
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of its evidence supporting the war in Iraq from phony
documents that were supposedly stolen from the Nigerien
embassy in Rome, which claimed that the Iraqi ambassador

had agreements with Niger to purchase uranium (used to
make nuclear weapons).

One of the final rhetorical events

that lead this country from September 11th to the current

war in Iraq was the creation of the White Paper.

The

White Paper, a condensed version of the NIE, distorted

many of the findings in the original NIE to make Iraq seem
like a more imminent threat than it actually was.

The overall response of the Bush Administration to

the rhetorical events and situations that occurred is
simple, denial.

When faced with questions about WMDs and

why they had not been found in Iraq, the response of the
Bush Administration was that the weapons were in the
mountains or had been hidden in a friendly country.

These

responses demonstrated that even if the Bush
Administration had failed to provide the American public

with definitive proof that Iraq had WMDs, they would not
admit they were wrong.

If the Bush Administration

admitted that the war in Iraq had been based on shaky

evidence at best, they would be admitting that they had
sent many of this Nation's children to their death under
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false pretenses.

It seems as if the Bush Administration

was working under the premise that they had the best of
intentions and they were justified in invading Iraq.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary
After examining the rhetorical events that led this

country from September 11th to the current war in Iraq, it

becomes evident that some of the theoretical perspectives
discussed in chapter one and chapter two apply to the
situation under examination.

The theoretical perspectives

that apply to these events are persuasive appeals and
agenda setting.
As noted previously, persuasive appeals are

categorized by both primary and secondary emotions.

The

persuasive appeal that the rhetoric and propaganda of the
Bush Administration appeared to target the most was that

of fear.

Just the mention of WMDs and all they entailed

was sufficient to instill fear in members of the
Administration and the American public.

Members of the

Bush Administration used the fear appeals to convince the

President that Saddam Hussein was producing WMDs that
might possibly be used on the United States.

Members of

the Administration used the falsified Nigerien documents
to plant the fear that Iraq had an agreement with Niger to
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purchase uranium ore, which was to be used in the
production of nuclear weapons.

Fear was also used by the

Administration when it claimed that confiscated aluminum
tubes were going to be used by the Iraqis to spin uranium
at high speeds, a process that is involved in making

nuclear weapons.

Another persuasive appeal that was used

by the neoconservatives of the PNAC was pride.

The

neoconservatives took their pride and also their arrogance

in the democratic system and turned it in to a potential
opportunity to spread democracy throughout the Middle East

and make it a place with a more sympathetic regime, so

that they might further their own goals.
The second theoretical perspective that applies to
the rhetorical events that led this country to war is

agenda setting theory.

Agenda setting involves the media

conveying the information to the public that it feels is

important.

Although the agenda is typically set by the

media, the Bush Administration exerted control over the
agendas set by the media.

The Administration's

involvement with agenda setting became apparent when it

began embedding journalists during the war in Iraq.

According to Schechter (2003), the idea to embed
journalists with troops took root in 2002, when the
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Pentagon approached editors with the opportunity.
Schechter also claims that the strategists at the

Pentagon, who were in the process of planning the war,
expected journalist to broadcast certain things over their

airwaves.

The images that the journalists were to portray

needed to be proud, positive, and patriotic.

Journalists

were not allowed to provide sensitive information and were
limited in terms of filming dead bodies.

Media stories led the public to have misperceptions

about the war in Iraq.

According to Kull (2004), a study

revealed that the media led to several misperceptions.

These misperceptions included: 1. 49% of those who were
surveyed believed that United States had found evidence

proving that Iraq had ties to Al Qaeda, 2. 22% of those
surveyed believed that the United States had proof of

weapons of mass destruction, and 3. 23% of those surveyed
believe that the public opinion of the world favored

America going to war with Iraq.

Kull also states,

"When

the press are reluctant to challenge what government

leaders say, they can simply become a means of

transmission for administration rather than serve as a
critical filter for information."

(p. 65)

According to

Barstow, Stein, and Kornblut (2005), the Bush
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Administration also influenced the agenda setting of the
media by providing them with prepackaged news.

Barstow

et. al. claim that the Administration used public
relations and provided the media with news reports that

were prepackaged.

Barstow et. al. state that,

"Some

reports were produced to support the administration's most

cherished policy objectives, like regime change in Iraq .
.

."

(para. 6)

These prepackaged news pieces were

broadcast in some of the United State's largest television

markets, which included New York, Los Angeles, Chicago,

Dallas, and Atlanta.

Barstow et. al. also claim that the

prepackaged news distributed by the Administration

appeared to be like any other segment on the local news.

Conclusions

After researching the topic of my project, there were
many things that I expected to find.

I expected to find

that the Bush Administration had been untruthful to the

American public about Iraq's WMDs.

I also expected to

find that there would be instances where the government

would take advantage of the fear that was in the hearts of

many and use that to further their desire to go to war
with Iraq.
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Examining the rhetoric of the Bush Administration

leading to the current war in Iraq confirmed my first
expectation, that the Bush Administration had been

untruthful about Iraq's possession of WMDs was true.

The

strongest piece of evidence that supports the

Administration had been untruthful to the American public
was the phony documents stolen from the Nigerien embassy

in Rome.

Although it was found that the documents were

phony, the Bush Administration still used the information
contained within them as their strongest piece of evidence

supporting a war in Iraq.

The only thing that mattered to

them was that the documents claimed the Iraqi ambassador
had an agreement to purchase uranium from Niger, which was

to be used to produce WMDs.
My research also revealed that when the Bush

Administration learned of aluminum tubes that were
intercepted en route to Iraq from China, they claimed that

these tubes were going to be used as centrifuges to spin
uranium and was evidence of Iraq's nuclear weapons

program.

However, the Administration- failed to inform the

public that there was disagreement about whether or not
the tubes were meant for the enrichment of uranium.

Greg

Thielmann and a scientist from the Department of Energy
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were not convinced that the tubes were meant to be used as
centrifuges.

George Tenet, former director of the CIA,

chose to believe that the aluminum tubes were evidence
that Iraq was producing WMDs.
The aluminum tube evidence prompted the CIA to write
the NIE document, which stated that the tubes were strong

evidence that Hussein was producing WMDs.

When Congress

requested that they be provided with a document that was
more conclusive than the NIE, the White Paper was created,

which led the administration to be untruthful to the
American public yet again.

The White Paper was an

extremely condensed version of the NIE.

The document had

taken information that was presented cautiously in the NIE
and turned it in to statement of fact.

Essentially the

White Paper turned information that was deemed

insufficient by Congress to declare war to presenting the
scariest case for war possible.
My second expectation was also confirmed by the

rhetorical events that are'mentioned above.

The Bush

Administration used the phony documents from Niger, the
aluminum tubes, the NIE, and the White Paper to take

advantage of the fear that America was feeling after
September 11th.

The Administration understood that people
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in the United States feared the possibility of more

terrorist attacks on the country.

The neoconservatives in

the Bush Administration took advantage of this fear by

leading the public to believe that Saddam Hussein had WMDs
that he planned to use against the United States.
However, what

I

did

not

expect

to

find was that this

quest for a regime change in Iraq had been in the minds of

so called,

"neoconservatives" for many years.

Before

beginning this project, it was almost unthinkable for me
that there was a group of people in this country that

would take the suffering of the thousands, perhaps
millions, to fulfill their idea of what they believe the

world should be.

Reflecting back to the literature review and what was

discovered about propaganda during times of war and

conflict, I have learned that rhetoric and propaganda
played a major role in bringing our country from the
events of September 11, 2001 to the start of the war in
Iraq on March 19, 2003.

The use of rhetoric and

propaganda made it possible for the neoconservatives to
first convince President Bush that going to war with Iraq
was the right decision, then take the fears of the

American public and use them to justify a war in Iraq.
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This is similar to the way that rhetoric and propaganda

was used during WWI, WWII, and the Cold War to gain
support for war.
The neoconservatives in the Bush Administration

accomplished their goal of going to war with Iraq buy
using rhetoric and propaganda in. different ways.

The

rhetoric and propaganda of the neoconservatives in the

Administration began almost immediately after the events
of September 11th.

After the terrorist attacks, the

neoconservatives began pushing the Iraq agenda by telling

President Bush that they believed that the country was
involved in the. attacks on the country.

The alleged

intention of Iraq to purchase uranium from Niger further

pushed the agenda of the administration by providing more
information supporting the assertion that Iraq had WMDs.

Finally, the NIE and the White paper were the final pieces

of rhetoric used by the administration to justify their

case for war.

The White Paper essentially frightened the

American public into accepting that a war in Iraq was the
best course of action.

The media reported all of these

"facts."

Dyer (1942) asserted that if. .propaganda is

successful, it emphasizes all of the extremes and does not
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often admit that there is a middle ground.

Dyer (1942)

further asserts that a propagandist is led to take a
portion of the truth and dress it as either black or
white, which results in statements that are part truth and
part lie.

It seems that the neoconservatives and other

members of the Bush Administration were using propaganda
according to Dyer's definition.

The Bush Administration

had information that was part truth and part lie (the

phony documents from the Nigerien embassy).

The

administration either believed that this information was
complete or they did not care if it was incomplete.

Recommendations
After completing the research for the project,

are several recommendations for future research.

there

The

first suggestion is that future researchers should
consider conducting primary quantitative research.

Survey

research might discover how Americans were affected by

news coverage and the suggestions of WMDs by the Bush

Administration leading to the beginning of the war in
Iraq.

Future researchers might also compare the rhetoric

of "left-" versus "right-" wing focused media.
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Doing so

will enable researchers to present the focus of the
"opposition," which was not discussed in this project
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